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There are many unknowns when it comes to discussions about Siamese 
twins. We do not know what causes the phenomenon of conjoined twins,1 
we do not know what process determines how the twins will be conjoined, 
and we do not know why they are more common in girls than in boys. 
Why are thoracopagical twins (who are joined at the chest) the most com-
mon type of conjoinment making up 75% of cases of Siamese twins,2 
while craniopagus twins (who are connected at the head) are less com-
mon?  
When it comes to integrating conjoined twins into greater society, an-
other bevy of unknowns is unleashed: Are they one person or two? Could 
they get married?3 Can they be liable for corporal/capital punishment? 
Contemporary thought may have difficulty answering these questions, es-
pecially the last three, which are not empirical inquiries. Fortunately, in 
                                                   
1  R. Yisroel Yehoshua Trunk of Kutna (1820–1893) claims that Jacob and Esau 
gestated within a shared amniotic sac in the womb of their mother Rebecca (as 
evidenced from the fact that Jacob came out grasping his older brother’s heel). 
As a result, there was a high risk that the twins would end up sticking together 
and developing as conjoined twins. In order to counter that possibility, G-d mi-
raculously arranged for the twins to restlessly “run around” inside their mother’s 
womb (Gen. 25:22) in order that the two fetuses not stick together. See Shut 
Yeshuot Malko vol. 2 (Piotrkow, 1927), p. 74a. 
2  T. Izukawa, et al., “Assessment of the Cardiovascular System in Conjoined Tho-
racopagus Twins,” American Journal of Diseases of Children vol. 132 (1978), p. 19. 
3  This issue of marriage for conjoined brothers has more recently appeared in the 
genre of popular Jewish literature in the fictional short-story “The Joiner” by 
Ezra Olman, which was published in Lehrhaus (December 1, 2016) [URL: 
https://www.thelehrhaus.com/culture/the-joiner/]. 
2  :  Ḥakirah, the Flatbush Journal of Jewish Law and Thought 
 
the world of halacha, a methodology exists for approaching such ques-
tions, and while the final rulings may be subject to dispute, the halachic 
realm certainly remains a forum for intelligent discussion of the topic. 
 
Two-headed Men in the Talmud and Midrash 
 
Any and all discussion about the status of conjoined twins in halacha be-
gins with a Talmudic passage that seems to address the issue—at least in 
some limited way:4  
 
Plimo asked Rebbe: “He who has two heads, upon which head 
should he lay tefillin?” He said to him, "Either rise up and go into 
exile or accept excommunication upon yourself." Meanwhile, a cer-
tain man came and told Rebbe: “A baby was born to me that has 
two heads. How much am I required to give to the Kohen [for re-
demption of the firstborn]?” A certain elder came and taught to him 
that he was obligated to give ten sela [instead of the usual five].  
 
The Talmud then clarifies this ruling by explaining that redemption 
of the firstborn is dependent on the “head” (gulgolet)5 as is implicit in the 
                                                   
4  Previous treatments of this topic include: J. D. Bleich, “Conjoined Twins,” Tra-
dition: A Journal of Orthodox Jewish Thought vol. 31:1 (1996), pp. 92–125; J. D. 
Bleich, “Hafradat Teomim Siamiim Baalei Lev Echad,” Or ha-Mizrach vol. 45 (1997), 
pp. 70–88; pp. 92–125; J. D. Bleich, “Conjoined Twins,” in Bioethical Dilemmas 
(Hoboken, NJ, 1998), pp. 283–328; and E. Reichman, “Are Two Heads Really 
Better Than One? Halakhic Issues Relating to Conjoined Twins and a Two-
Headed Person,” The Journal of Torah and Medicine of the Albert Einstein College of 
Medicine Synagogue and RIETS vol. 4 (New York, NY: Yeshiva University Press, 
2012), pp. 35–59. This paper intends to summarize the relevant arguments in 
those works and supplement them, with a focus on sources not thoroughly dis-
cussed previously. 
5  The Torah uses the word gulglotam when describing the general census of the 
Jewish People (sans the Tribe of Levi), but does not use that word when de-
scribing the census of the Tribe of Levi. R. Moshe Sofer (1762–1839) in Shut 
Chatam Sofer (Yoreh Deah §294) cites those who explain that this is because the 
word gulglotam implies that each head should be counted separately, even if one 
person has two heads. Therefore, when counting the Tribe of Levi, the Torah 
does not use that word because the Levities are counted from the age of thirty 
days and up. Since a child born with two heads could live beyond thirty days, 
using the word gulglotam might cause a child with two heads to be double-
counted. Therefore, the Torah does not use that word for the Levitical census. 
However, the rest of the Jews were counted only from the age of twenty years, 
and a child born with two heads cannot possibly live that long—because having 
two heads is considered a treifah with a limited lifespan of twelve months—so 
the Torah was free to use the word gulglotam, without being wary of double-
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wording of Numbers 18:3. Therefore, because both heads of the firstborn 
could have simultaneously left the mother’s womb, both have the status 
of the firstborn and the father is obligated to redeem both heads from the 
Kohen.6 
R. David Ganz (1541–1613) writes in the name of the Roman histo-
rian Dio Cassius (155–235) that in the time of the Roman Emperor An-
tonius Pius (86–161), a woman gave birth to a boy that had two heads.7 
R. Matisyahu Strashun (1817–1885)8 writes that he is inclined to say that 
this person is the child mentioned in the Talmud who was born in the 
time of Rebbi (a contemporary and friend of Antonius).9 
However, R. Yitzchak of Vienna (1200–1270) writes that the Talmud 
sometimes refers to fantastic phenomena that do not really exist, and cites 
Plimo’s question as an example of such an occurrence.10  
Nevertheless, other Tosafists11 write that while a person with two 
heads does not exist in this world, it does exist in the realm of the demons.12 
                                                   
counting. Nonetheless, in light of the other sources that we shall discuss below, 
R. Matisyahu Strashun in Mitet-Yah (to Shemot Rabbah §2:5) argues that a person 
with two heads can live beyond twelve months because only a treifah due to the 
absence of a limb has such a limited lifespan, but not a treifah due to the presence of 
an extraneous limb (Shach, Yoreh Deah §57:48). See also Yad David (to Menachot 37a), 
Shut Chikrei Lev (Yoreh Deah vol. 1 §26), Shut Pri ha-Sadeh (vol. 3, §139), Shut Avnei 
Nezer (Yoreh Deah §399), Petach Einaim (to Menachot 37a), Chiddushei ha-Grach al 
ha-Shas (Menachot 37a), and Chazon Ish (Yoreh Deah §183). 
Similarly, R. Chaim Kanievsky in Taama de-Kra (to Num. 26:53) explains that the 
Torah does not say gulglotam in the context of inheriting portions of the Holy 
Land because a two-headed person receives only one portion (as seen from the 
story about King Solomon, see below), yet writing gulglotam would imply that for 
every head, a portion is allotted. Nonetheless, this explanation is not so clear-cut 
because the Midrash concerning King Solomon does not state that every time 
somebody has two heads, they are allotted only one portion of their father’s 
inheritance. Rather, the Midrash means that if it can be proven that the two 
heads really belong to one person, then he receives a single portion of inher-
itance. But if they are actually two people conjoined together, then the Midrash 
does not offer any ruling on that case. 
6  Menachot 37a. 
7  Tzemach David, Unit II, Year 3904. 
8  Mitet-Yah to Shemot Rabbah §2:5. 
9  See also A. G. Hug, Fecunditas, Sterilitas, and The Politics of Reproduction at Rome 
(Doctoral dissertation), p. 155. 
10  Ohr Zarua (Aveilut §424). 
11  See Tosafot (to Menachot 37a). 
12  R. Avraham Chaim Schor (d. 1632) explains (Tzon Kadoshim to Menachot 37a) that 
Rebbe told Plimo to go into exile because the Zohar says that in the place to 
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To that effect, the Tosafists cite a Midrash13 that relates that Ashmadai, 
the king of the demons, brought before King Solomon a two-headed de-
mon from the netherworld. That demon married a single-headed human 
woman and fathered single-headed children and two-headed children. 
Upon the demon’s death, his two-headed children demanded double por-
tions of his estate, while his single-headed children contested that claim.  
The Tosafists do not cite the conclusion of this Midrash, but other 
sources do. R. Betzalel Ashkenazi (1520–1592)14 relates that King Solo-
mon covered one of the heads with a linen cloth and poured boiling water 
on the other. In response to the pain, both heads screamed out, proving 
to the wise king that the two-headed entity is indeed one person and not 
two.  
Similarly, R. Yehuda Aryeh Modena (1571–1648)15 writes that he 
heard that Solomon used boiling water to determine whether both heads 
feel the same pain. R. Yosef Chaim of Baghdad (1832–1909) writes16 that 
what R. Modena wrote was an incomplete version of the Midrash. To 
supplement the story cited by the Tosafists, he cites the conclusion found 
elsewhere: Solomon asked for a linen cloth, hot water, and aged wine. He 
covered one head with the linen cloth and began to pour the hot water 
and aged wine on the other head. Suddenly, both heads screamed out, 
“We are dying! We are dying! We are one, we are not two! We will no 
longer say we are two people.”17 
R. Dr. Azriel Rosenfeld (1931–2004) draws from the Talmudic source 
above that a person with two heads is considered one person. He argues 
that if they were two people, then the query Plimo posed before Rebbe 
would be moot because both people would independently be obligated to 
don tefillin. Similarly, if they were considered two individuals, then surely 
their father would be obligated to give only five sela to the Kohen in order 
to redeem them because only one of them is the firstborn. However, from 
                                                   
where Cain was exiled, there are people with two heads. Therefore, Rebbe told 
Plimo to go into exile because there he would find such a person. 
13  R. Mordechai (in Halachot Ketanot, end of Hilchot Tefillin) cites this tale in the name 
of Pirkei de-Rabbi Eliezer. However, R. David Luria (1798–1855), in his introduc-
tion to Pirkei de-Rabbi Eliezer (Kuntres ha-Mavo §7), correctly points out that this 
story does not appear in Pirkei de-Rabbi Eliezer. 
14  Shittah Mekubetzet (there). 
15  Ha-Boneh to Ein Yaakov (Menachot 37a). 
16  Ben Yehoyada to Rosh Hashana 21b. 
17  A. Jellnik (ed.), Bet ha-Midrasch (Leipzig, 1878), pp. 151–152 and J. D. Eisenstein 
(ed.), Otzar Midrashim vol. 2 (New York, NY, 1915), pp. 533–534. See also Sinai 
vol. 19 (1956), pp. 20–23. 
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the Midrashic source above, R. Rosenfeld sees that a two-headed person 
can have the halachic status of two people, provided they have independ-
ent senses.18 
If we assume that the “two-headed person” refers to a pair of con-
joined twins who have only two heads, but no duplication of other major 
body parts—known as dicephalic twins—then we can attempt to deter-
mine the halachic status of such twins based on the above sources. Fol-
lowing Rosenfeld’s methodology, if we can determine that these twins 
have independent senses, then they are considered two people, and if they 
share their senses, then they are considered one person. From the story 
of King Solomon, we may posit that the specific sense that determines 
individualism or dualism is the sense of touch. 
 
Conjoined Twins in Rabbinic sources 
 
Before moving on to the halachic debate over the nuptial possibilities for 
conjoined twins, we will first survey accounts of such twins in both rab-
binic and secular literature, searching for a precedent upon which we may 
base our underlying assumptions. 
One of the earliest appearances in rabbinic literature may be the Mid-
rash itself. The Midrash19 says that G-d is allegorically called the “twin” 
of the Jewish people (Song of Songs 5:2) because just as with twins, if one 
feels pain in his head, his fellow twin also feels it, so does G-d feel the 
pain of the Jewish people, as it says, “With him, I am in distress” (Ps. 
91:15). R. Matisyahu Strashun finds it far-fetched to interpret this passage 
as referring to regular, non-conjoined twins because he does not see how 
one twin feels the pain of his sibling.20 Instead, R. Strashun assumes that 
the Midrash refers to conjoined twins who can possibly feel the sensations 
of each other (see below).21 
                                                   
18  See A. Rosenfeld, “The Heart, the Head, and the Halakhah,” New York State 
Journal of Medicine (October 15, 1970), pp. 2616–2617. 
19  Shemot Rabbah §2:5. 
20  Recent popular literature reports heightened empathy and possibly even ESP 
amongst twin siblings—even if they are not conjoined—than amongst other 
segments of the population. If this is true, then the Midrash can reasonably be 
interpreted to refer to regular twins. Nonetheless, I have been unable to find 
proper medical studies that either confirm or deny such phenomena. 
21  Mitet-Yah (to Shemot Rabbah §2:5). 
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A brief mention of two-headed people appears in the medical writings 
ascribed to Maimonides (1135–1204), who attributes a spate of such 
births to a solar eclipse.22 
R. Isaiah of Trani (1180–1250) reports that he heard from other Jews 
that they saw a twenty-year-old woman with two backs, two spines, and 
two heads. Each head had its own pair of eyes, could eat independently, 
and had its own two arms (in total, four eyes and four arms). But, from 
the waist and downwards, she had one singular body. This lady was pa-
raded before the local king dressed in fine clothes.23  
Later, R. Gershon ben Shlomo of Catalonia (a 13th-century Spanish 
sage)24 writes that sometimes a woman can give birth to a child that has 
two heads and two upper-bodies, while from the navel downwards, they 
share a body. He claims to have seen such a child. He also mentions that 
Ali Ibn Ridwan (988–1061), an Egyptian-Arabic physician, testifies in his 
commentary to Galen’s medical writings to having seen such a monstrosity. 
What is more, R. Gershon records the following story in the name of 
the Muslim philosopher Avicenna/Ibn Sina (980–1037):25 A woman once 
gave birth to Siamese twin girls who had separate heads, hands, and feet, 
but were joined at the hip. Eventually, somebody proposed marriage to 
one of these sisters (A), but the other sister (B) refused. B not only re-
fused, but she also claimed that A should not get married because her 
would-be husband will end up seeing her (B) naked (a universal violation 
of decency/privacy). The two sisters went to court, where a wise judge 
presided. When the two sisters sat in front of the judge, the judge called 
B and asked her to stand on her feet, but she was unable to move from 
                                                   
22  S. Muntner (ed.), Kitvei Refuiim Pirkei Moshe (Jerusalem: Mossad HaRav Kook, 
1952), p. 302. 
23  See Piskei ha-Rid, Niddah (Jerusalem: Machon HaTalmud HaYisraeli, 2012), pp. 
34–35 and Piskei ha-Rid, Chullin (Jerusalem: Machon HaTalmud HaYisraeli, 
2012), pp. 220–221. Chiddushei ha-Ritva (to Niddah 24a) writes that he saw one 
authority who testified about a woman with two backs and two spines, and she 
lived considerably long. R. Chaim Yosef David Azulai (1724–1806) in Petach 
Einaim (there) cites an alternate version of Ritva’s commentary in which he iden-
tifies the authority in question as R. Oshaya. R. Azulai proposes emending that 
passage to read “R. Yishaya,” a reference to the above-mentioned testimony of 
R. Isaiah of Trani. This passage is also found in R. Dosa the Greek’s hitherto-
unpublished commentary to Chullin, which was recently discovered in the so-
called “European Genizah.” 
24  He was the father of R. Levi ben Gershon (1288–1344)—better known as Ger-
sonides/Ralbag—and was possibly the son-in-law of Nachmanides. 
25  After some perusing, I have been unable to locate this story in Avicenna’s own 
writings. 
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her place to stand before the judge. He then called A and asked her to 
stand up. A was not only able to stand up, but she forcibly dragged B 
along, so both sisters stood before the judge. From this, the judge deduced 
that in reality A is the main person who controls the shared body and B 
is akin to a parasite who feeds from A’s body. Therefore, the judge ruled 
that A was allowed to get married. Not long after A got married, B died 
from utter embarrassment and distress, and, a short while later, A also 
died due to her sister’s rotting remains attached to her person.26  
R. Tuviah the Physician of Frankfurt (1653–1728), a graduate of the 
University of Padua, affirms that while training in medicine, he was shown 
the embalmed body of twin girls who shared a stomach. He also cites the 
same story that R. Gershon does in the name of Avicenna.27 Similarly, R. 
Yosef Chaim of Baghdad28 tells of a woman in Baghdad who gave birth 
to a baby with two heads. Although the child had two necks and two fully 
developed heads, the rest of the child’s body was singular. Nonetheless, 
that baby did not live more than three days. 
R. Chaim Elazar Shapiro of Munkatch (1868–1937)29 writes that as a 
child, he saw in Vienna conjoined twins who had two upper bodies (i.e. 
head, neck, and hands), but from the waist down, they shared one body.30 
R. Shapiro finds it difficult to argue that halacha considers them as one 
person, given that they had two separate hearts and heads. He therefore 
concludes that in such a case, each twin should don his own pair of tefllin.31 
 
  
                                                   
26  Shaar ha-Shamayim (Warsaw, 1876), p. 25a 
27  Maase Tuviah (Olam ha-Katan, ch. 6). 
28  Ben Yehoyada (to Menachot 37a). 
29  Ot Chaim ve-Shalom (§27:9). 
30  Based on the time, place, and anatomic description, Reichman 2012:42 estimates 
that R. Shapiro observed the Tocci brothers (see below). 
31  The Talmud (Megillah 7a) rules that the commandment of giving alms to the 
poor on Purim requires one to give charity to two separate poor men. R. Yaakov 
Bendtman (d. 1861) was once asked about whether one can fulfill this com-
mandment by giving charity to one person who has two heads (Shut Zichron Yaa-
kov, end of §7). He answered that if such a person existed, then one can possibly 
do so. However, he notes, such a two-headed person does not exist in this world, 
as asserted by Tosafot (cited above). R. Bendtman nonetheless adds that the case 
discussed by R. Reischer (below) is not one person with two heads, but two 
people joined at the head.  
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Rabbi Chagiz’s rulings 
 
R. Yisrael Yaakov Chagiz (1620–1674) 
writes: 
 
“I remember that I saw in Italy32 a 
gentile—about twenty-five years 
old—who was born attached to his 
twin until his waist, chest adjacent 
to chest, and from there they were 
attached. And he was mobile and 
completely like any other person. 
The smaller [twin]'s head is inclined 
towards one side and his feet were 
hanging downwards and reached to 
the knees of the larger [twin] and he 
did not have any feeling at all [in the 
attached part of his body], rather it 
was like a limb whose senses have 
been dulled and he lived many years 
with his twin.”33 
 
Three questions were raised: 1> If 
one murders the smaller twin, is the 
murderer liable or do we consider the smaller twin halachically non-exist-
ent? 2> Does we circumcise such a child? 3> How does this person live? 
The first two questions are purely halachic, while the last question is scientific.  
R. Chagiz opens his responsum by answering the last question first. 
He asserts that the smaller twin is sustained through the liver of his twin 
brother which filters and sends blood to his liver, just as a mother’s liver 
(and placenta) performs that function for her unborn child in utero. Re-
garding the smaller twin’s halachic status, R. Chagiz argues that this per-
son has the halachic status of a goses (a moribund individual), but he is 
nonetheless circumcised. R. Benzion Alkalei (1858–1913),34 disagrees 
                                                   
32  Based on the time, location, and description recorded by R. Hagiz, Reichman 
2012:52 asserts that he is referring to the Colloredo brothers, Lazarus and his 
parasitic twin Joannes Baptista, who were born in Italy in 1617. J. Bondeson, 
“The Biddenden Maids,” The Two-Headed Boy and Other Medical Marvels (Cornell 
University Press, 2004), p. x cites a French historian named Henri Sauval (1623–
1676) who wrote that Lazarus actually committed murder and was acquitted by 
a court of law on the grounds that punishing him with the death penalty would 
effectively kill his parasitic twin, as well. 
33  Shut Halachot Ketanot (vol. 1, §245). 
34  In his work Halacha Ravachat (a commentary to R. Chagiz’s Halachot Ketanot). 
A contemporary drawing of the Colloredo
twins born in Italy in 1617. Public domain. 
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with this last ruling, arguing that if such a person is considered a goses, then 
surely he is exempt from the commandment of circumcision. One cannot 
even move a goses, let alone surgically remove his foreskin. R. Chagiz also 
discusses whether or not one should recite the benediction mishane ha-
briyot upon seeing such a person and whether or not this child is entitled 
to a portion in his father’s inheritance. 
While not discussing conjoined human twins, per se, R. Chagiz was 
also asked about how to view the existence of conjoined chicks:  
 
QUESTION: In Verona, they showed two chicks that were attached 
from the side. It appears that they came from two different egg yolks. 
They had two heads, two necks, four feet, and both heads were able 
to eat. What is [the halachic status of this chicken (i.e. may it be eaten 
and how)]? 
ANSWER: It is a creature from the Six Days of Creation. According 
to the opinion that Adam was created thusly35 [i.e. Adam and his 
partner originally formed one back-to-back person], the other ani-
mals of creation were also possibly created so.36 If they [the chickens] 
live for twelve months, you may37 slaughter both heads like one (so 
as not to [invalidate the slaughtering by way of] waiting [in the middle 
of slaughtering]) [and the chicks may be eaten].38 
 
Although the rabbinic sources above clearly chronicle cases of con-
joined twins—with limited discussion of some halachic ramifications of 
such a condition—none of them address the possibility of marriage for 
such people. The only source that comes close to dealing with that issue 
is the story cited in the name of the non-Jewish scholar Avicenna. 
 
  
                                                   
35  Eruvin 18a. 
36  R. Yosef Engel (Gilyonei ha-Shas to Berachot 61a) cites the commentary of 
Chizkuni (to Gen. 2:23) who explicitly writes that only man was created thusly, 
while other animals were not. In R. Engel’s assessment, this passage offsets R. 
Chagiz’s supposition. 
37  See Shut Shaar ha-Zekenim, Beit Milo §19 who disagrees with R. Chagiz and rules 
that an animal with two heads is considered a treifah and may not be eaten. See 
also Darkei Teshuvah (Yoreh Deah §50:16) regarding such an animal. 
38  Halachot Ketanot (vol. 1, §249). 
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Conjoined Twins in non-Jewish Sources 
 
From the eleventh century and onwards, as reports of conjoined twins 
increased, Christian scholars began to debate, inter alia, whether conjoined 
twins could contract a valid marriage.39 A Christian scholar in France 
named Eustache of Grand Court (who lived in the late 13th century thru 
early 14th century) was asked about the theoretical possibility of marriage 
for conjoined twins. He answered this query by responding in the nega-
tive. He rejected the possibility of marriage for conjoined twins—female 
twins, in the case he considers—on the grounds that they are considered 
two distinct people with two distinct wills.40  
Eustache buttresses his position with a triad of arguments: Firstly, 
marriage, by definition, requires the consent of two entities. Therefore, 
since conjoined twins have separate intellectual faculties, both would need 
to accede to marriage, making the total parties in the marriage contract 
three, instead of two. Ergo, marriage for conjoined twins is, by definition, 
impossible. Secondly, even if one sister should wed, leaving the other a 
legal spinster, such an arrangement is also untenable. Because the two sis-
ters have only one shared genitalia, then when the married sister cohabits 
with her husband, he has effectively committed adultery by fornicating 
with she who is not his wife. Thirdly, not only would the husband violate 
the ban on adultery, he would also concurrently commit incest by lying 
with his wife’s sister.41 Nonetheless, Eustache ultimately concludes that 
because the twins have “separate wills and separate acts of consent” they 
can, in fact, independently enter valid marriages.42 
Indeed, historians mention several cases of conjoined twins—both 
male and female—who actually did wed. One historical source mentions 
                                                   
39  See I. Resnick, “Conjoined Twins, Medieval Biology, and Evolving Reflection 
on Individual Identity,” Viator vol. 44:2 (2013), p. 347. 
40  Another “practical” ramification of the legal status of conjoined twins for Chris-
tian scholars was whether they required one baptism or two. The English church 
leader John Peckham (1230–12921) considers both options in response to such 
a question. Ultimately, he concludes that conjoined twins have two souls, so the 
pair requires separate baptisms, a position also adopted by Guido of Mont 
Rochen (a 14th-century Spanish priest). Similarly, Henry of Ghent (1217–1293) 
wrote that if conjoined twins have two hearts, then they require two separate 
baptisms, but if they share one heart, they need only one (Resnick 2013:356–
358; 363). 
41  Maimonides (Laws of Melachim 9:5) lists the forbidden incestuous relationships 
for non-Jewish people and does not mention any prohibition of marrying two 
sisters. That prohibition applies only to Jews. 
42  Resnick 2013:354–355. 
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the case of conjoined brothers in Switzerland in 1538. They were ob-
served at the age of 30, by which time both faces had beards and the two-
headed man was happily married to one wife.43 
Conjoined twins are colloquially called “Siamese twins” after the case 
of Chang and Eng Bunker (1811–1874), who were born in Siam (Thai-
land). Those two brothers were put on display in the famous circus of P. 
T. Barnum (1810–1891). Eventually, they respectively married two (un-
joined) sisters and established a joint home with a bed for four. However, 
eventually the sisters came to resent each other, so the twins established 
separate households, alternating weekly with each wife. Chang fathered 
six normal, healthy children and Eng, five. The brothers lived to the age 
of sixty-three and ultimately died within hours of each other.44 
The famous Tocci brothers 
(Giacomo and Giovanni Battista) 
had one set of genitals, but none-
theless married two separate 
women. This unusual arrangement 
gave way to a flock of legal ques-
tions including how to determine 
paternity should one of the wives 
bear issue and how the brothers’ 
fortune may be divvied among their 
inheritors. In the end, the brothers 
may have actually died childless. 
Their exact years of birth and death 
are unknown, but they lived in the 
late 1800s.45 
The twins Rosa and Josepha 
Blazek (who were positioned back-
to-back and joined at the sacrum, 
known as pyopagic twins) were 
born in 1878 and were reputed to 
have married one man.46 On the 
other hand, Simplicio and Lucio 
Godina, who were born in 1908, 
                                                   
43  J. Bondeson, “Dicephalus Conjoined Twins: A Historical Review with Empha-
sis on Viability,” Journal of Pediatric Surgery vol. 36:9 (2001), p. 1436. 
44  Bleich 1996:93 and J. G. Wilson & J. Fiske (eds.), “Chang and Eng,” Appletons' 
Cyclopædia of American Biography (New York: D. Appleton, 1900).  
45  Bondeson 2001:1441. 
46  See J. Bondeson, “The Biddenden Maids,” The Two-Headed Boy and Other Medical 
Marvels (Cornell University Press, 2004), p. 154. 
The Tocci brothers on display in Berlin (circa.
1891). Public domain. 
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were male pyopagic twins and were reputed to have married identical (un-
joined) sisters. In 1936, Lucio died of pneumonia and was subsequently 
surgically separated from his brother Simplicio, who died twelve days 
later. 
 
The Hogan Girls 
 
In contemporary times, doctors are baffled by the case of Krista and Tati-
ana Hogan—a pair of twins conjoined at the head. Not only are those 
girls joined at the head, but they also share parts of their brain. The two 
girls are reputed to share a thalamus, which is the brain’s sensory relay 
center. As a result, their brains receive sensory input from each other’s 
bodies, so each sister could see through the eyes of the other or could feel 
the physical sensations experienced by the other. They are, nonetheless, 
two independent people with their own individual preferences and pro-
clivities.47 
 
Demons with Two Heads 
 
As mentioned above, the Midrash relates that King Solomon tested 
whether a certain two-headed person was really one person or two by 
pouring boiling water on one head and seeing if the other reacted. This 
implies that personhood is defined by the ability to independently experi-
ence sensations of touch. In the case of the Hogan twins, then, it would 
seem that because they share their sense of touch, they might, halachically 
speaking, be considered one person. This conclusion is somewhat odd 
because the two girls definitely have different personalities and besides 
their shared sensory perception, they have the ability to think inde-
pendently from one another.  
R. Yitzchok Minkovski of Karlin (1788–1851) writes that the type of 
two-headed beings mentioned in the Midrash are not people and do not 
have the halachic status of people. Even if they were to accept upon them-
selves the commandments of the Torah (i.e., they would convert to Juda-
ism), they still would not become obligated in the commandments be-
cause they are not human.48  
                                                   
47  This case has been reported both in medical journals and in the popular press. 
See J. Squair “Craniopagus: Overview and the Implications of Sharing a Brain,” 
University of British Columbia's Undergraduate Journal of Psychology vol. 1 (2012), pp. 
and S. Dominus, “Could Conjoined Twins Share a Mind?,” The New York Times 
Magazine (May 25, 2011).  
48  Keren Orah (to Menachot 37a). 
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Similarly, R. Yosef Chaim of Baghdad49 cites the Midrash about King 
Solomon and infers from that Midrash that Solomon’s litmus test was not 
simply a scientific experiment to determine whether they were one person 
or two, but rather relied on supernatural elements. If it was simply a sci-
entific test, Solomon could have used boiling water alone. The fact that 
he needed boiling water, linen cloth, and aged wine proves that Solomon’s 
test was predicated on certain supernatural notions. Indeed, R. Yosef 
Chaim elsewhere50 adds that Solomon had to resort to supernatural meth-
ods of detection because the person in question was not human, but par-
tially a demon (from his father’s side).51 
In line with these understandings, we may argue that in determining 
the individuality of a part-demonic being, King Solomon’s test works. 
However, the story of Solomon cannot teach us how to determine the 
individuality of a fully human person with two heads. Therefore, we can-
not learn anything about how to decide whether conjoined twins are one 
or two people from the Midrash cited by the Tosafists. This, of course, 
begs the question why the Tosafists cited said Midrash if it bears no ha-
lachic relevance. 
Rabbi J. D. Bleich seems to understand that Solomon’s test was not 
just to determine whether they shared common pain receptors, but to use 
that example for determining whether or not they shared an entire nerv-
                                                   
49  Ben Yehoyada (to Rosh Hashana 21b). 
50  Benayahu (to Eruvin 18a). 
51  This suggests that the offspring issued from a union of a demonic male and a 
human (Jewish) female is considered a demon and not human (or even Jewish). 
However, see Kav ha-Yashar (ch. 25) which seems to maintain that such a child 
is considered Jewish and even requires a circumcision. R. Chaim Elazar Shapiro 
discusses this source and others in Ot Chaim ve-Shalom (§266:12) and concludes 
that such a child is not considered human or Jewish. See also R. C. Klein, ha-
Makom me-Rachok al Yevamot (Beitar Illit, 2015), p. 152.  
A legend tells of a certain family in the Hungarian Unterland who are descendants 
of such a union. According to the story, a Jewish woman returning from the 
Mikvah was raped by a demon and her descendants became a family of brazen 
troublemakers who fought many rabbinic figures in the Unterland region. See 
Shut Chayei Asher (§123) and P. Miller, Olamo Shel Abba (Jerusalem: Hod Publish-
ers, 1984), pp. 132–134. Nonetheless, leading rabbinic figures such as R. Shlomo 
Shapiro (1831–1893) and his grandson R. Chaim Elazar Shapiro deny the verac-
ity of this tale, arguing that it was simply slander spread against an otherwise 
upstanding family. Their letters on this topic appear in B. Weinberger (ed.), Iggros 
Shapirin (Jerusalem: Ohr Torah Munkatch, 1998), pp. 146–150. See also Shut le-
Horot Natan (vol. 7 §86) and Shut Mishneh Halachot (vol. 12 §291). 
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ous system. In his own words, he writes: “It may indeed be cogently ar-
gued that King Solomon's use of scalding water as a test to determine 
whether both heads respond to a single pain stimulus was, in actuality, an 
attempt to determine whether or not the two heads share a common nerv-
ous system. If so, separate identity is predicated upon an independent 
nervous system.”52 In the case of the Hogan twins, it appears that they 
indeed have two separate nervous systems, although the two systems are 
nonetheless linked. This would mean that they would have the halachic 
status of two people. 
 
*** 
The Possibility of Marriage  
 
In the following paragraphs, we will consider three approaches regarding 
the halachic possibility of a conjoined twin entering a legal marriage. The 
prospect of marriage itself actually complicates the issue as a sort of catch-
22 because the kiddushin that creates the marriages also creates the ervah-
level prohibitions of eshet ish (married woman), eshet achiv (his brother’s 
wife), and achot ishto (his wife’s sister). We will have to take into account 
the risk of these three prohibitions when talking about allowing conjoined 
twins to marry. 
 
1. The first approach essentially forbids any marriage on the grounds 
that because the conjoined twins are attached, if one engages in sexual 
intercourse with one twin, one has effectively also engaged in inter-
course with the other twin. By this approach, if one marries a con-
joined twin and consummates the marriage, then one has violated an 
ervah-level prohibition of the Torah.  
2. The second approach maintains that conjoined twins are viewed as 
completely separate entities in regard to the Torah’s sexual prohibi-
tions. However, squarely because they are separate entities, they can-
not get married due to secondary and tertiary concerns: If the twins 
are male, then one will inevitably violate the Biblical prohibition of 
“approaching” an ervah (Lev. 18:6) should his brother marry a woman. 
If the twins are female, then the married sister would inevitably violate 
the prohibition of copulating in front of others. 
3. The third approach understands that conjoined twins may have the 
legal status of one person. This approach assumes that there is always 
a dominant twin and a less-dominant twin. Therefore, the dominant 
twin assumes the primary position and the less-dominant twin is mar-
ginalized. According to this reasoning, even though they are viewed 
                                                   
52  Bleich 1996:119. 
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as one person, intercourse with one twin does not amount to an ervah-
prohibition because of the other, for the other twin is essentially con-
sidered non-existent. 
 
Approach #1: Pregnancy as a Precedent 
 
An animal upon which the act of bestiality is committed assumes the legal 
status of a nirba (animal used for illicit cohabitation) and is thus disquali-
fied from ritual sacrifice. The Talmud53 rules that if one cohabits with a 
pregnant animal, not only does the mother assume the status of nirba, but 
so does her offspring. The Tosafists54 write that even according to the 
opinion that “a fetus is not the thigh of its mother,” both the animal and 
its issue are disqualified.  
Drawing from this precedent, R. Akiva Eiger (1761–1837)55 under-
stands that any time a man engages in sexual activity with a pregnant be-
ing—animal or human—he effectively cohabits with the fetus in utero, as 
well. Thus, R. Eiger asks: How can a man cohabit with his pregnant wife, 
if by doing so he may effectively be cohabiting with his own daughter (if 
the child is female)?  
R. Eiger resolves this issue on a technical basis. The Talmud56 rules 
that sex with a female human under the age of three does not have the 
legal status of sex. Therefore, even if by cohabiting with one’s wife one is 
considered to be cohabiting with his daughter, the Biblical prohibition of 
incest does not apply because she is less than three years old. Although 
incest with a girl younger than three is technically permitted according to 
Biblical law, doing so is nonetheless forbidden by Rabbinic fiat under the 
umbrella prohibition of the wasteful destruction of semen (because a girl 
that young cannot yet conceive). Based on this, R. Eiger argues that since 
cohabiting with one’s pregnant wife is certainly not considered the waste-
ful destruction of semen (even though she generally cannot become preg-
nant again),57 the Rabbis never decreed that one should refrain from doing 
so. Therefore, even though by engaging in relations with his pregnant 
wife, a man may be halachically cohabiting with his own unborn daughter, 
such an act is completely permitted because the daughter is certainly 
                                                   
53  Temurah 30b. 
54  To Bava Kamma 47a. 
55  D. Bitton (ed.), Shut Rabbi Akiva Eiger vol. 2 (Jerusalem: Machon Hamaor, 2002), 
pp. 585–586 and S. Arieli (ed.), Shut Rabbi Akiva Eiger vol. 3 (Jerusalem, 2011), 
pp. 70–72; 296–298. 
56  Yevamot 57b (see Rashi and Rashba there). 
57  See Pesachim 72b and Tosafot ha-Rosh (Yevamot 12b). 
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younger than three years old and there is no prohibition of wasting se-
men.58 
R. Eiger’s entire treatment of this issue is predicated on an assumption 
relevant to our discussion about conjoined twins. It seems that both his 
question and answer59 assume that because one’s unborn daughter is at-
tached to his wife, then his wife should somehow become forbidden to 
him—even if we say “a fetus is not the thigh of its mother.” This author 
infers from R. Eiger’s responsum that he understands that if a permitted 
woman is somehow attached to an incestuous relative, then even sex with 
the permitted woman is prohibited at an ervah-level. In the case of con-
joined sisters, if one sister is married to a man, he should become prohib-
ited from cohabiting with his wife because she is attached to the ervah of 
his wife’s sister (achot ishto). Conversely, if the conjoined twins are broth-
ers, then the wife of the married brother should be forbidden to her hus-
band because he is attached to her husband’s brother (eshet achiv).60 
 
Problems with R. Akiva Eiger 
 
Nonetheless, the assumptions R. Akiva Eiger makes in his discussion and 
the conclusions we drew from those assumptions are not unanimously 
accepted.  
It is related that R. Chaim Soloveichik (1853–1918) held R. Eiger in 
great esteem and once remarked that R. Eiger never proffered any con-
voluted logic, save for two cases. One of those two cases is the above-
                                                   
58  Anan ben David, the 8th-century founder of the Karaite movement, writes that 
a man is prohibited from cohabiting with his pregnant wife once she has reached 
her second trimester and the bulge of her fetus is plainly visible. His reasoning 
for such a prohibition is because when one engages in intimacy with his wife in 
such a state, he is also considered to be engaging in sexual relations with the 
child inside her—either his daughter or a man—which is forbidden. See S. 
Shechter (ed.), Ginzei Shechter vol. 2 (New York, NY, 1929), p. 478. R. Menachem 
Kasher (1895–1983) in Torah Shleimah vol. 17 (Jerusalem, 1992), p. 309 writes 
that although R. Eiger was most likely unaware of this Karaite source and did 
not intend to issue an anti-Karaite polemic, Divine Providence nonetheless 
guided him to unknowingly refuting the Karaite stance on this issue. 
59  For alternate answers, see Tiferes Yisroel (Temurah 6:5 §3) and Shut Rabbi Shlomo 
Eiger (vol. 2, writings §31). 
60  In a private conversation with the author about the topic of conjoined twins, R. 
Yonasan Wiener from Ramot (a dayan in the Badatz Shearis Yisroel and posek of 
Yeshivas Ohr Somayach in Jerusalem) also compared the construct of conjoined 
twins to R. Eiger’s case of a pregnant wife. 
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mentioned discussion in which R. Eiger questions how one can be per-
mitted to cohabit with his pregnant wife. The basic premise of R. Eiger’s 
question extends the Talmudic assertion that one who cohabits with a 
pregnant animal disqualifies both the animal and its offspring from being 
offered as a sacrifice to the realm of sexual prohibitions between humans. 
However, in truth, R. Soloveichik argues that the Talmud only means to 
extend the disqualified status to the offspring, but does not mean that the 
prohibited act is considered to have been done to the offspring as well. 
Thus, R. Soloveichik rejects R. Eiger’s application of said Talmudic prin-
ciple, instead limiting it only to the case in which it was explicitly used.61 
Furthermore, R. Yisroel Yaakov Fischer (1928–2003)62 writes that he 
does not even understand R. Eiger’s opening question63 because sexual 
prohibitions outlaw intercourse only in the sexual organs. Therefore, even 
if copulating with one’s pregnant wife is, in some way, tantamount to en-
gaging in sex with the unborn child attached to its mother, this should not 
be considered a violation of any sexual prohibition. Nonetheless, this dif-
ficulty has already been addressed by R. Akiva Eiger’s son, R. Shlomo 
Eiger (1785–1852),64 who explained that the sexual prohibitions of the 
Torah do not simply outlaw certain acts of intercourse; rather, they forbid 
deriving certain sexual pleasures from forbidden unions.65 
 
Approach #2: Ruling of R. Yaakov Reischer 
 
R. Yaakov Reischer (1670–1733) reports that in the year 1707, he saw a 
pair of non-Jewish brothers who were conjoined at the head (side by side), 
but were otherwise completely separate people. At that juncture, some-
body asked him what the halachic status of such twins would be if they 
                                                   
61  See Mesorah: A Torah Journal vol. 6 (1991), p. 43 and C. D. Altusky, Chiddushei 
Batra (ha-Masbir to Bava Kama §207). 
62  Even Yisroel to Maimonides’ Laws of Ishut 7:16. 
63  To answer R. Akiva Eiger’s question, R. Fischer argues that the designation of 
ervah can come into existence only once the person in question is born. There-
fore, since one’s unborn daughter is as-of-yet unborn, she cannot yet be consid-
ered an ervah. (This answer does not explain why cohabiting with one’s pregnant 
wife is not a possible violation of homosexual intercourse in case the child is 
male).  
64  Shut Rabbi Shlomo Eiger (vol. 2, writings §31). 
65  This understanding is not exclusive to R. Shlomo Eiger; it has been proposed 
by many prominent Talmudists, including R. Yosef Engel (1858–1920) in Atvon 
de-Orayta (§24), R. Baruch Ber Leibowitz (1862–1939) in Birkat Shmuel (Kiddushin 
§20), and R. Elchonon Wasserman (1874–1941) in Kovetz Shiurim (vol. 2, §23:6). 
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were Jewish. In response, R. Reischer penned an entire halachic respon-
sum dealing with this issue.  
R. Reischer begins by noting that the Talmudic discussion of a two-
headed person pertains only to a case in which there is one body and the 
only limb that is duplicated is the head. In that situation, the Talmud un-
derstood that the two-headed person is indeed one individual. However, 
R. Reischer points out that the twins he observed were certainly consid-
ered two different people because they have two separate bodies, which 
are only coincidently joined at the head.  
After a lengthy discussion of the different ramifications of conjoined 
twins in halacha,66 R. Reischer finally discusses their status in family law. 
In the case of conjoined brothers, R. Reischer totally rules out marriage 
on the basis that such a marriage leads to worries of AA—which is a He-
brew abbreviation that can stand for either the ervah-level prohibition of 
eshet ish (“the wife of a man”, i.e., adultery) or eshet achiv67—because the 
unmarried brother would inevitably lie in the same bed as the other’s 
wife.68 Moreover, he notes that because there is a prohibition for one to 
                                                   
66  According to halacha (Shulchan Aruch, Even ha-Ezer §161:4), when brothers are 
obligated to perform chalitzah, the firstborn brother should optimally perform 
the rite. In the case of conjoined twins, R. Reischer writes that the brother po-
sitioned on the right has precedence over the other brother, but he fails to ex-
plain whether this is true even if the brother on the left is the firstborn or not. 
67  R. Yehuda Gershon Pikholz (1844–1914) in Shut Machane Yehuda (vol. 2 §2) as-
sumes that when R. Reischer writes AA, he means eshet ish, not eshet achiv. He 
argues that R. Reischer chose not to mention the prohibition of eshet achiv be-
cause that would imply that if the conjoined twins were gentiles and converted 
to Judaism, then they would halachicly be considered like “newly born babies” 
(Yevamot 22a) and therefore not related to each other, so each would be allowed 
to marry eshet achiv, if she is no longer an eshet ish (e.g., his brother dies or divorces 
her). However, this explanation seems to be at odds with the ruling of the Shul-
chan Aruch (Yoreh Deah §169:3) who maintains that the permission of a convert 
to marry his brother’s wife applies only to his paternal brother who is not his 
maternal brother. Thus, in the case of conjoined twins who are surely maternal 
brothers, even if they are converts to Judaism, the prohibition of eshet achiv still 
applies. 
68  Similarly, R. Menashe Grossberg (1860–1927) rules that conjoined sisters are 
considered different people, so if one man married both of them, he has violated 
the incestuous prohibition of marrying a woman and her sister. A man may 
technically be permitted to marry one of the sisters, but R. Grossberg argues 
that it should nonetheless be forbidden because the man would become familiar 
with his wife’s sister and could likely end up cohabiting with her as well. None-
theless, R. Grossberg does allow for the marriage of one sister after the death of 
her attached sister. See M. Grossberg, Degel Menashe (Berlin, 1892), pp. 28–29. 
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engage in copulation in the presence of others,69 conjoined twins cannot 
marry, whether they are two brothers, two sisters, or even a brother and 
sister,70 because all their sexual encounters would take place in the pres-
ence of the other.  
Nonetheless, R. Reischer rules that the father of conjoined twins has 
fulfilled his commandment of procreation. He maintains that even though 
one cannot generally fulfill the commandment of procreation by siring 
children who cannot propagate further, in this case it is only a halachic 
technicality that bars them from doing so—not a physiological limita-
tion.71  
In short, R. Reischer understands that while conjoined brothers tech-
nically can enter halachic marriages and even consummate such unions, 
doing so is nonetheless forbidden because of the secondary issue involv-
ing “worries” of an ervah-level prohibition and “approaching” an ervah. In 
regard to conjoined sisters or conjoined male-female twins, R. Reischer 
forbids marriage because of the tertiary concern of copulating in front of 
others. 
 
R. Akiva Eiger’s Question 
 
R. Akiva Eiger, in his glosses to R. Reischer’s responsa, quibbles over R. 
Reischer’s wording regarding the case of conjoined sisters. R. Reischer’s 
wording implies that the only problem barring marriage for conjoined sis-
ters is the tertiary issue of engaging in sexual relations in the presence of 
other people. R. Eiger asks why R. Reischer wrote that instead of writing 
that there is the problem of the husband being intimate with his wife’s 
sister (achot ishto). In other words, just as R. Reischer wrote that conjoined 
                                                   
69  Niddah 17a. 
70  The scientific consensus denies the possibility of conjoined male-female twins 
because conjoined twins are understood to be formed by the splitting of a single 
zygote, which can be only male or female, but not both. See I. Blickstein, “The 
Conjoined Twins of Löwen,” Twin Research vol. 3 (2000), pp. 185–188 for a dis-
cussion of a 1547 German illustration that purports to depict a pair of conjoined 
male-female twins. That paper calls into question the veracity of the phenome-
non depicted based on the premise that conjoined twins are always of the same sex.  
This fact also renders unsustainable the argument that the Talmudic conception 
of the formation of Adam and Eve mirrors the concept of conjoined twins (as 
R. Chagiz proposed concerning the conjoined chicks) because all cases of such 
twins are pairs of same-sex siblings, while Adam and Eve obviously were not. 
71  Shut Shevut Yaakov vol. §4. 
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brothers cannot get married because of “worries” of an ervah-level prohi-
bition of eshet achiv, so too conjoined sisters should not be able to get mar-
ried for the same fear of achot ishto.72 
If our first approach—based on R. Akiva Eiger—has any standing, 
then R. Akiva Eiger should have raised a stronger objection to R. 
Reischer’s ruling. In our first approach, we argued that R. Akiva Eiger 
understood that sexual contact with any woman who is “attached” to an 
ervah is tantamount to having sexual contact with the ervah herself. If so, 
then R. Akiva Eiger should have asked why R. Reischer writes that with 
conjoined brothers there is only a “worry” of an ervah-level prohibition, if 
it is actually an ervah-level prohibition. Nevertheless, R. Akiva Eiger takes 
R. Reischer’s assumption that there is no actual ervah-level prohibition and 
does not question it. To resolve this issue, we may posit that when R. 
Reischer wrote that there is a “worry” of an ervah-level prohibition, R. 
Akiva Eiger understood that to mean that there is an actual ervah-level 
prohibition, not just a secondary problem. 
 
Resolving R. Reischer’s Ruling 
 
To answer why R. Reischer ignored the prohibition of marrying two sis-
ters, R. Yosef Shaul Nathansohn (1808–1875)73 proposes a novel ruling 
about that prohibition. R. Chaim Alfandari (1660–1733)74 suggests that 
because the Torah limits the prohibition against marrying one’s wife’s sis-
ter to the lifetime of one’s wife (Lev. 18:18), then if she becomes a treifah 
and is thus no longer considered wholly alive, her husband can now marry 
her sister.75 This has ramifications in the case of conjoined sisters because 
                                                   
72  This gloss is first mentioned in R. Yosef Patzanavsky’s Pardes Yosef (to Gen. 1:27) 
and was subsequently published in D. Bitton (ed.), Shut Rabbi Akiva Eiger vol. 5 
(Jerusalem: Machon Hamaor, 2005), p. 148. 
73  In his approbation to the publication of R. Reischer’s work Shut Shevut Yaakov. 
74  Maggid me-Reishit, end of §2. 
75  Truth be told, R. Alfandari actually writes that he is unsure whether or not this 
logic is sound, yet R. Nathansohn cites him as though he concludes with cer-
tainty that it is. See also R. Nathansohn‘s Shut Shoel u-Meishiv (4th ed., vol. 2 §54) 
where he again cites R. Alfandari as though the latter decided in accordance with 
this logic. Other authorities outright reject R. Alfandari’s suggestion; see R. Yis-
rael Yaakov Algazi’s Kehillat Yaakov (Middot Chachamim, §9 s.v. טריפה), Shut Ma-
chane Yehuda (vol. 1 §43), Pitchei Teshuvah (Even ha-Ezer §15:11), Shut Beit Yitzchak 
(Yoreh Deah vol. 1 §62:18 and vol. 2 §99:6), and R. Shalom Yosef Feigenbaum 
(d. 1928) in Kol Torah vol. 11–12 (Pabjanice, 1928), pp. 5–7. See also Tosafot (to 
Niddah 23a, s.v. לאיתסורי) which clearly implies that even if a woman is a treifah, 
her husband may not marry her sister. 
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if under such an arrangement the conjoined sisters have the halachic sta-
tus of a treifah, then the prohibition of achot ishto may not apply. With this 
in mind, R. Nathansohn explains why R. Reischer ignored the prohibition 
of achot ishto and instead resorted to the tertiary problem of copulation in 
front of others. 
R. Yitzchok Schmelkes (1828–1904)76 answers this difficulty by sup-
posing that R. Reischer’s discussion concerns the case of conjoined sisters 
who were born non-Jewish and underwent conversion. Such sisters, alt-
hough biologically siblings, are halachically not considered related to each 
other, so they can both legally marry the same Jewish man without violat-
ing the ervah prohibition of achot ishto. Therefore, R. Reischer did not men-
tion the prohibition of marrying two sisters, instead appealing to the pro-
hibition of copulating in the presence of others.77 
R. Schmelkes addresses the elephant in the room by noting that in the 
case of R. Reischer, each twin had her own reproductive organs, so he 
ruled that the twins cannot get married. However, R. Schmelkes notes 
that he heard of a case of conjoined twins on display in Vienna78 in which 
the twins have one shared reproductive organ. In that situation, he admits 
                                                   
  
76  Shut Beit Yitzchak (Yoreh Deah vol. 1 §62 and vol. 2 §99:4). 
77  R. Schmelkes clarifies that even though the Biblical prohibition of marrying two 
sisters does not apply to converts, there is a Rabbinic prohibition barring one 
man from marrying two proselyte sisters (see Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah §269:5). 
Still, R. Schmelkes explains that R. Reischer disregarded this prohibition because 
the rabbis did not decree that it should be in effect in the case of conjoined twins 
either because doing so would effectively bar the sisters from all marriage or 
because rabbinic ordinances apply only to common situations—which con-
joined twins are clearly not. 
Without realizing that R. Schmelkes himself addresses this point, R. Avraham 
Sofer Abraham in Nishmat Avraham vol. 3 (Jerusalem, 2007), pp. 4–5 inde-
pendently asks about how R. Schmelkes can ignore the Rabbinic prohibition of 
marrying two sisters who converted to Judaism. He then cites an halachic re-
sponsum written by R. Eliezer Yehuda Waldenberg (1915–2006) to answer this 
question (Shut Tzitz Eliezer vol. 17 §49:2). R. Waldenberg essentially argues that 
the Rabbinic prohibition of marrying two sisters who converted does not apply 
post facto to two sisters who were married to one man before they were Jewish 
and want to remain with him after their conversion. Therefore, he explains that 
R. Schmelkes argued that R. Reischer ignored the prohibition of marrying two 
sisters because in case they were converts who were already married to one man, 
that prohibition does not apply. So instead, R. Reischer sought to mention a 
blanket prohibition that would apply across the board in all cases. 
78  Reichman 2012:47 suggests that R. Schmelkes was discussing the Tocci twins 
who were on display in Vienna. 
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that the ruling may change. Indeed, R. Dr. Edward Reichman suggests 
that dicephalic twins (who have two heads, but otherwise share their lower 
body parts) might be considered one person in halacha because they have 
only one set of reproductive organs.79 
 
A Contemporary Look at R. Reischer’s Ruling 
 
R. Yitzchok Zilberstein finds it difficult to accept R. Reischer’s argument 
that the prohibition of engaging in copulation in the presence of others 
should prevent conjoined twins from ever getting married. That prohibi-
tion is only a custom derived from considerations of modesty and in the 
best-case scenario can be considered a rabbinic law. Such a weak mandate 
cannot supersede the stronger, Biblical commandment of procreation and 
bar conjoined twins from marriage. Moreover, R. Zilberstein suggests that 
perhaps the prohibition of engaging in copulation in the presence of oth-
ers applies only to individuals who could engage in copulation privately, 
but do not do so. However, in the case of conjoined twins, since they will 
always be in the presence of the other, perhaps this prohibition does not 
apply.  
Similarly, we can argue—although R. Zilberstein does not take note 
of this—the tertiary concern of copulation in front of others lends itself 
to flexibility in certain cases. For example, a couple is allowed to engage 
in sexual relations in the presence of another, if that other person is sleep-
ing.80 So in the case of conjoined twins, that prohibition can be avoided 
if the married sibling is careful to only engage in sex while the other sibling 
is asleep (if possible).  
After trying to fully understand R. Reischer’s ruling,81 R. Zilberstein 
ultimately concludes his treatment of the topic by citing the words of his 
                                                   
79  Reichman 2012:51. 
80  See Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim §240:6) who allows for such behavior. However, 
in Even Ha-Ezer §25:2, the Shulchan Aruch codifies the prohibition of copulation 
in front of others and does not add the caveat that it applies only if the other is 
awake. See Otzar ha-Poskim (to Even ha-Ezer §25:14). 
81  In defending R. Reischer’s ruling, R. Zilberstein offers a slight twist on the mat-
ter. The Talmud (Nedarim 20b) states that “children of a mixture” are considered 
blemished offspring. The commentaries (see Pirush ha-Rosh and pseudo-Rashi 
there) explain that this refers to a man who engages in sex with one of his wives, 
but is at the time unaware of with which wife he is cohabiting. Accordingly, 
since a man who marries conjoined twins will always encounter this issue because 
both sisters will always be in his presence during cohabitation, his offspring will 
inevitably be blemished. As a result, such a person would become exempt from 
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esteemed brother-in-law, R. Chaim Kanievsky. R. Kanievsky is sympa-
thetic to the plight of conjoined twins and says that one should delve as 
deep as possible into the depths of halacha in order to find a way to permit 
Siamese twins to marry. He adds that seemingly flimsy halachic arguments 
should not bar such people from fulfilling the commandment of procre-
ation for their entire life.82 
 
Approach #3: Ben Ish Chai’s Ruling 
 
R. Yosef Chaim of Baghdad provides a rather lengthy excurses on the 
topic of conjoined twins and, inter alia, offers a ruling on their marriage 
prospects.83 He cites Avicenna’s story and takes note of several questions 
that could arise if Jewish conjoined twins were born. Firstly, if the twins 
are girls, he wonders whether they are considered sisters so that one is 
halachically barred from marrying both of them, just as one cannot marry 
two regular sisters. Secondly, he wonders whether in order to get married 
both girls would need to receive kiddushin from the groom, or if one twin 
accepts kiddushin, the other is automatically also married to him.  
R. Yosef Chaim then revises his first two questions by noting that 
their answers are interdependent. That is, if the two girls are considered 
sisters in regard to the prohibition of achot ishto, then they must be halachi-
cally considered separate people, so the kiddushin of one sister has no bear-
ing on the other. However, if the two are not considered sisters in regard 
to the prohibition of achot ishto, then they must be halachically considered 
the same person, so that if one accepts kiddushin, it is effective for the 
other as well. 
Following the same basic question, R. Yosef Chaim wonders about 
two halachic ramifications that would occur should the twins be boys: 
First, he wonders if they count as two people towards a minyan (quorum 
of ten Jewish men required for the recitation of certain especially holy 
parts of the prayers). Secondly, he wonders if these twins would receive 
two portions of their father’s inheritance or only one portion. 
                                                   
the commandment of procreation, which does not require him to bring blem-
ished children into the world. Thus, because he is now exempt from procreation, 
there would be no reason to allow for him to engage in relations in front of the 
other sister, thereby supporting R. Reischer’s ruling that conjoined twins cannot 
get married.  
However, R. Zilberstein’s reasoning might actually serve as grounds for allowing 
conjoined brothers to marry because the problem of “children of a mixture” 
might apply only to a mixture in the thoughts of the husband, but not to a mix-
ture in the thoughts of the wife. 
82  Chashukei Chemed to Niddah 17a. 
83  Benayahu to Eruvin 18a. 
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R. Yosef Chaim cites the Talmudic passage about the two-headed 
person and writes that one cannot answer these questions from the fact 
that such a child, should he be a firstborn, is obligated to be redeemed 
twice, because that ruling is a Scriptural imperative derived from the word 
gulgolet in the Bible, but cannot serve as a general indicator of the halachic 
outlook of such a person.  
Moreover, Plimo asked on which head a person with two heads 
should place his tefillin. By asking his question in this way, Plimo assumes 
that such a person is obligated to wear tefilllin on only one head and his 
question was which one. This presupposes that a person with two heads 
has the halachic status of one person. Nonetheless, R. Yosef Chaim ex-
plains that this does not conclusively answer his above-mentioned ques-
tions because the Talmudic discussion centered on a person who is com-
pletely singular, except that he has two heads. In contrast, R. Yosef 
Chaim’s case based on Avicenna’s story involves twins who also have sep-
arate limbs, not just separate heads, but are nonetheless attached. The sta-
tus of such a pair cannot be derived from the Talmudic passage concern-
ing the two-headed person.  
Additionally, R. Yosef Chaim notes that if the reality would be shown 
that should one head be killed, the other would automatically die, then 
that would conclusively prove that they are one person. However, in the 
case of Avicenna, it is evident that the lives of the two heads were not 
dependent on each other, and, indeed, in many documented cases of his-
torical conjoined twins, one twin survived for some time after the death 
of his/her attached twin.84 So the question remains whether or not they 
can halachically be considered the same person. 
In one treatment of this issue, R. Yosef Chaim’s writing stops short, 
so his conclusion is not included. However, in another work of his,85 he 
writes about this topic and the ensuing discussion essentially mirrors the 
above, except that this time he comes closer to a conclusion.86  
To answer the questions at hand, R. Yosef Chaim compares the case 
of Siamese twins to the case of a half-slave, half-freedman. In the latter 
                                                   
84  See I. Resnick, “Conjoined Twins, Medieval Biology, and Evolving Reflection 
on Individual Identity", Viator vol. 44:2 (2013), pp. 345–346; 355. 
85  Ben Ish Chayil (vol. 2, pp. 13a–14b). 
86  In that discussion, he infers from Avicenna’s story that the weaker twin cannot 
bear children, while the dominant twin can. He then notes that it might then 
technically be forbidden for a man to engage in sexual relations with the weaker 
twin because he will inevitably be wasting his seed. Nonetheless, R. Yosef Chaim 
writes that one can still discuss whether or not engaging in sex with both sisters 
after giving them each kiddushin creates an ervah-situation or not. 
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case, the two contradictory statuses bear equal standing and do not cancel 
each other. The result of this dynamic is that such a person cannot even 
fulfill his own halachic obligations to, say, blow the shofar or hear Megillat 
Esther, because his slave half cannot discharge the obligation of his freed 
half.87  
Based on this precedent, R. Yosef Chaim proposes that in conjoined 
twins, the two opposing “people” within their body should bear equal 
standing and neither can cancel out the other. The result would be that 
they should have the halachic status of two people.  
However, R. Yosef Chaim rejects this logic because the comparison 
is flawed: the half-slave, half-freedman is truly half-half, neither option 
has any stronger standing than the other. By contrast, in the case of the 
twins, Avicenna has already demonstrated that one twin is the domi-
nant—especially in terms of physical control over their shared body—and 
one is the weaker. If such is the case, then the rules of a half-slave, half-
freedman cannot prove anything about the halachic status of conjoined 
twins.88 
R. Yosef Chaim then compares the case of conjoined twins to the 
halacha of a person who is half-Jew, half-gentile. Such a person can be 
executed for committing sins for which a Jew receives capital punishment, 
even though his gentile half is not culpable for such sins. Conversely, if a 
half-Jew, half-gentile carries out a crime for which gentiles are executed, 
but Jews are not, he is not liable for the death penalty because his Jewish 
half asserts itself to exempt him from such punishment.89 This paradigm 
demonstrates that when a person is of two diametric statuses, his most 
prominent status asserts itself as primary and is ultimately used to define 
the person’s final status. The other status, in turn, is considered null and 
void vis-à-vis the primary status. According to this, the dominant twin 
                                                   
87  See Beit Yosef, Orach Chaim §689 and Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim §589:5. 
88  Much of this approach is independently considered by Bleich 1996:98–99.  
89  When mentioning these laws, R. Yosef Chaim refers to a work entitled Machane 
Chinuch. However, this is almost certainly a scribal error, as the discussion about 
a half-Jew, half-gentile is most famously found in the work of R. Yosef Babad 
(1801–1874), Minchat Chinuch (Kometz Minchah §347). Indeed, R. Babad (there) 
writes what R. Yosef Chaim quotes in the name of Machane Chinuch. The same 
mistake seems to be repeated in R. Yosef Chaim’s Shnei Eliyahu (Jerusalem, 
1968), p. 7b which elaborates on the case of the half-Jew, half-gentile and again 
refers to Machane Chinuch. See however, R. Yosef Chaim’s responsum in Hod 
Yosef (Jerusalem, 1983), p. 37, first published in Kovetz ha-Measef vol. 11 (Jerusa-
lem, 1906), p. 51a, which correctly identifies the name of the work in question 
as Minchat Chinuch. 
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should assert his or herself over the weaker twin and the two should be 
considered one person.  
However, R. Yosef Chaim also rejects this analogy. He argues that the 
case of a half-Jew, half-gentile cannot serve as precedent for the case of 
conjoined twins because the conflicting statuses of the half-Jew, half-gen-
tile are not physically observable, they are simply a conflict in legal status. 
Such a conflict can be resolved by following the most prominent/domi-
nant of the two options. However, in the case of conjoined twins, the 
discussion vacillates not merely between two abstract statuses, but rather 
between two readily observable “persons” attached to one body. In such 
a case, we cannot simply consider the weaker body null and void if the 
physical reality demands that we reckon with its existence. Therefore, R. 
Yosef Chaim concludes that this too cannot serve as a model for deciding 
the halachic status of conjoined twins. 
In his final argument, R. Yosef Chaim cites the Mishnah90 that rules 
that a Jewish court should not wait for a pregnant woman to give birth 
before executing her, unless she is already in labor. Rashi91 explains that 
we do not wait to kill the pregnant woman because she and the child in-
side her are considered one body, so they collectively will receive the death 
penalty. However, once she already entered labor and the fetus began ex-
iting the body, the fetus’ movement from its uterine home essentially de-
clares it an independent body and since the fetus is exempt from the death 
penalty, we must wait until after its birth to execute the mother.92  
R. Yosef Chaim deduces from Rashi’s understanding that a fetus of a 
pregnant woman is not considered a separate entity until such time as it 
asserts its independence in labor.93 But beforehand, the fetus’ independ-
ent existence is considered null and void in deference to its mother to 
whom it is attached. Therefore, because the mother is liable for execution, 
                                                   
90  Erachin 1:4. 
91  To Erachin 7a. 
92  In contrast to Rashi, R. Nissim of Gerona (to Chullin, Alfasi 19a) writes that the 
reason we do not wait until the fetus is born is because of the prohibition of 
delaying the execution of a person’s judgement. In light of that explanation, R. 
Yosef Chaim admits that his own conclusion is not as clear-cut and perhaps 
even the opposite may be true. 
93  For some reason, R. Schmelkes (Shut Beit Yitzchak, Yoreh Deah vol. 2 §99:6) com-
pares the case of conjoined twins to the case of a pregnant woman in labor and 
rules that if one of the twins would commit a capital offense or be liable for 
corporal punishment, then they would automatically become exonerated in or-
der that the innocent twin not suffer for the consequences of the guilty twin’s 
actions. The case of the Colloredo brothers (mentioned above) is similar to this 
exercise. 
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the fetus is executed along with her. From this we see that even when 
dealing with two physically observable “bodies,” the dominant body as-
serts its dominance over the weaker body and the two are collectively 
granted the status of the dominant body. According to this, R. Yosef 
Chaim concludes, conjoined twins are considered one person and collec-
tively assume the status of the more dominant twin.94 
 
Approach #3: Conjoined Twins are One 
 
This means that according to R. Yosef Chaim, a man is allowed to marry 
a set of conjoined twin sisters because they are considered one person and 
require only one Kiddushin to be given (to the dominant one). If the con-
joined twins are male, then they receive only one portion in the inher-
itance of their father and they count as only one person for a minyan. In 
terms of marriage, if the dominant brother gives a woman Kiddushin, both 
brothers have effectively married her. 
Nonetheless, this ruling should apply only if there is a dominant twin 
and a weaker twin, but in a case where there is no clearly dominant twin, 
it would seem that each twin independently asserts its personhood and 
they should be regarded as two different people. However, R. Yosef 
Chaim somewhat implies that he understood from Avicenna that in all 
cases of conjoined twins, one must be dominant and the other, weaker. If 
that is the reality, then even if it is unknown which one is dominant, it 
would make no difference in halacha and they would still be considered 
one person. Therefore, in the case of marrying conjoined sisters, if both 
sisters agree to marry one man, then Kiddushin can be effected on both of 
them because either way the dominant sister already gave her consent. 
And in the case of conjoined brothers, if both brothers offer Kiddushin to 




We have essentially explored different places in rabbinic writings in which 
the phenomenon of conjoined twins appears. We surveyed various such 
examples and questioned whether the siblings should be looked at as one 
or two people. The contemporary story of the Hogan sisters served as our 
case study for questioning what exactly defines individuality in this con-
text and we were left with the choices being either an independent sense 
of touch or an independent nervous system (or independent genitals).  
                                                   
94  D. Engber, "If a Siamese Twin Commits Murder, Does His Brother Get Pun-
ished, Too?," Slate Magazine (January 5, 2010) also draws a comparison between 
the legal status of a pregnant woman and of conjoined twins. 
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Then we segued into the question whether conjoined twins could get 
married. The very possibility of marriage complicates their status. To sum-
marize that discussion, we found three very different points of view: In 
the first approach—drawn from different assumptions made by R. Akiva 
Eiger—we argued that conjoined twins are considered two different peo-
ple and, by virtue of their attachment to each other, cannot get married 
because they will always cause the other to violate an ervah-level sexual 
prohibition. Secondly, according to R. Yaakov Reischer, though they are 
technically considered two different people, they still cannot get married 
because of other concerns (which may be dispensable in certain situa-
tions). Thirdly, we saw the approach of the Ben Ish Chai who seems to 
understand that the two are considered one person and completely as-
sume the position of the more dominant twin. By this rubric, conjoined 
twins should be allowed to marry. All three of these approaches have their 
merits and drawbacks and the evidence remains inconclusive as to a final 
halachic psak.  
